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NON-COMPETITION AGREEMENTS IN VIRGINIA
IN THE AFTERMATH OF HOME PARAMOUNT PEST
CONTROL V. SHAFFER
Kevin E. Martingayle *
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 4, 2011, the Supreme Court of Virginia released
its opinion in Home Paramount Pest Control Cos. v. Shaffer.! The
issue before the court was whether a "non-compete" provision in
an employment agreement was overbroad and unenforceable.2
Although the court acknowledged that twenty-two years ago it
reviewed and approved virtually identical restrictive language in
Paramount Termite Control Co. v. Rector, the six-member majori-
ty of the seven-member court observed that it has "incrementally
clarified the law since that case was decided" and reasoned that
intervening decisions required a finding that the circuit court
ruled correctly in determining the provisions to be overbroad and
unenforceable.3
While the 2011 Home Paramount decision has been regarded
by some as marking a seismic shift in Virginia jurisprudence on
restrictive covenants,4 it is far more accurate to assess the opinion
* Partner, Martingayle & Bischoff, P.C., Virginia Beach, Virginia. J.D., 1991, Uni-
versity of Virginia School of Law; B.A., 1988, Hampden-Sydney College.
1. 282 Va. 412, 718 S.E.2d 762 (2011).
2. Id. at 414, 718 S.E.2d at 763.
3. Id. at 414, 420, 718 S.E.2d at 763, 766 (citing Paramount Termite Control Co. v.
Rector, 238 Va. 171, 380 S.E.2d 922 (1989)).
4. Jeffrey L. Berger, The Times They Are A'Changin: Alarming New Decision Re-
quires Employer Review of Non-Competes, ACG NAT'L CAP. (Jan. 24, 2012), http://acgcapi
talblog.com/tag/home-paramount-pest-control-v.-shaffer/; Heath H. Galloway & Reba M.
Mendoza, Virginia Supreme Court Exterminates Another Non-Compete, RICH. BAR (Nov.
30, 2011), http://www.richmondbar.orgtbusiness -law -tipNovember 2011.pdf; Timothy M.
McConville, Virginia Supreme Court Ruling Signals Shift in Non-Compete Law, LABOR &
EMP'T L. COCKTAIL (Nov. 10, 2011), http://laborandemploymentlawcocktail.com/a-mix of_
labor-and employ/201 1/1 1/virginia-supreme-court-ruling-signals-shift-in-non-compete-law
-by-timothy-m-mcconville-esq.html.
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as simply confirming the message that the supreme court has de-
livered in an unbroken line of cases since 2001, starting with
Simmons v. Miller.' Specifically, the court has vigorously ana-
lyzed restrictions on post-employment competitive activities, and
the use of broadly restrictive language almost certainly will cause
the covenant to fail.6
II. THE THREE-PRONG TEST APPLICABLE TO COVENANTS
NOT TO COMPETE
The test applicable to non-compete agreements is well-
established and was not changed by the 2011 Home Paramount
decision. It consists of these elements:
(1) Is the restraint, from the standpoint of the employer, reasona-
ble in the sense that it is no greater than is necessary to protect the
employer in some legitimate business interest?
(2) From the standpoint of the employee, is the restraint reasona-
ble in the sense that it is not unduly harsh and oppressive in curtail-
ing his legitimate efforts to earn a livelihood?
(3) Is the restraint reasonable from the standpoint of a sound
public policy?7
III. SIMMONS V. MILLER AND THE TREND AGAINST
ENFORCEMENT OF NON-COMPETES
In the 1990s, the Supreme Court of Virginia issued several
opinions in favor of employers seeking to enforce restrictive cove-
nant language.8
However, starting with Simmons v. Miller in 2001, the trend
reversed,' and the supreme court signaled a deepening skepticism
of the propriety of enforcing post-employment competitive re-
strictions. In Simmons, the court analyzed this language:
5. 261 Va. 561,581,544 S.E.2d 666, 678 (2001).
6. E.g., id. at 581-82, 544 S.E.2d at 678-79.
7. Richardson v. Paxton Co., 203 Va. 790, 794, 127 S.E.2d 113, 117 (1962) (internal
citations omitted); see also Home Paramount Pest Control Cos., 282 Va. at 415, 718 S.E.2d
at 763-64 (internal citations omitted) (paraphrasing the elements and test set forth in
Richardson).
8. See, e.g., Advanced Marine Enters. v. PRC, Inc., 256 Va. 106, 119, 501 S.E.2d 148,
156 (1998); New River Media Grp., Inc. v. Knighton, 245 Va. 367, 370, 429 S.E.2d 25, 26-
27 (1993); Blue Ridge Anesthesia & Critical Care, Inc. v. Gidick, 239 Va. 369, 374, 389
S.E.2d 467, 470 (1990).
9. 261 Va. at 581, 544 S.E.2d at 678.
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For a period of three (3) years after this termination or expiration of
the Agreement, Employee shall not directly or indirectly, own, man-
age, control, be employed by, participate in, or be connected in any
manner with ownership, management, operation, or control of any
business similar to the type of business conducted by Employer at
the time this Agreement terminates.10
This restrictive language, the court noted, involved an employ-
er that imported merely "one particular brand of cigars grown
and manufactured in the Canary Islands," and yet purported to
restrict 'any business similar to the type of business conducted
by Employer.""'1 The court also observed that the non-competition
clause was "without geographical limitation," whereas the em-
ployer "had exclusive rights to import and distribute" its product
in a limited area.'2 Finally, the court determined that a three-year
restriction was a '"engthy duration."'8
The Simmons court explained that "in determining the reason-
ableness and enforceability of restrictive covenants, trial courts
must not consider function, geographical scope and duration as
three separate and distinct issues. Rather, these limitations must
be considered together."'4
Based upon the facts in the record and the language in the
agreement, the court determined that "the restrictive covenant
was greater than necessary to protect the legitimate business in-
terests of [the employer], and unduly harsh and oppressive in
curtailing [the employee's] legitimate efforts to pursue her liveli-
hood."' Describing this as an "unnecessary and unreasonable re-
straint of trade," the court determined that the restrictions were
"offensive to the public policy of the Commonwealth" and "not en-
forceable."' 6
Later in 2001, the court decided Motion Control Systems, Inc. V.
East and confirmed a trial court ruling that the subject covenant
not to compete "imposed restraints that exceeded those necessary
to protect the legitimate business interests of [the company] and,
10. Id. at 580, 544 S.E.2d at 678.
11. Id. at 581, 544 S.E.2d at 678.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 582, 544 S.E.2d at 678-79.
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therefore, was unenforceable."" In this case, the language at is-
sue provided:
Therefore, the Employee agrees that for a period of two years after
termination of their employment with the Company in any manner
whether with or without cause, the Employee will not within a one
hundred (100) mile radius of the Company's principal office in Dub-
lin, Virginia, directly or indirectly, own, manage, operate, control, be
employed by, participate in, or be associated in any manner with the
ownership, management, operation or control of any business similar
to the type of business conducted by the Company at the time of the
termination of this Agreement. The term "business similar to the
type of business conducted by the Company" includes, but is not lim-
ited to any business that designs, manufactures, sells or distributes
motors, motor drives or motor controls.18
Concluding that the trial court was correct in declaring such
restraints to be excessive, the court stated:
By defining a "similar business" as "any business that designs, man-
ufactures, sells or distributes motors, motor drives or motor con-
trols," MCS's covenant also prohibits employment in any business,
for example, that sells motors, regardless of whether the motors are
the specialized types of brushless motors sold by MCS. As the trial
court concluded, under this provision, the restricted activities "could
include a wide range of enterprises unrelated to" the business of
MCS.'1
The next year, the court announced its opinion in Modern En-
vironments, Inc. v. Stinnett, and once again determined that an
employer failed to demonstrate the reasonableness of restrictions
it sought to impose, The primary problem spotted by the court in
Modern Environments was a blanket prohibition against the for-
mer employee working in "any capacity" for a competing company
in the restricted geographic area during a restricted time period.2'
The court noted that the company offered "neither argument nor
evidence of any legitimate business interest that is served" by
such a broad restriction,22
The employer in Modern Environments argued, unsuccessfully,
that the supreme court had "previously enforced identical or simi-
17. 262 Va. 33, 38, 546 S.E.2d 424, 426 (2001).
18. Id. at 36, 546 S.E.2d at 425.
19. Id. at 37-38, 546 S.E.2d at 426.
20. 263 Va. 491, 495-96, 561 S.E.2d 694, 696 (2002).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 495, S.E.2d at 696.
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lar language in other employment agreements and [had] not held
such language to be over-broad."23 Among the decisions cited by
the employer was Paramount Termite Control Co. v. Rector,' the
case that would later be reversed in the 2011 Home Paramount
Pest Control Cos. v. Shaffer decision.2' However, the Modern En-
vironments court made an effort to distinguish its prior opinions,
rather than reversing any of them, reasoning:
In the cases relied upon by Modern, however, this Court did not limit
its review to considering whether the restrictive covenants were fa-
cially reasonable. The Court examined the legitimate, protectable in-
terests of the employer, the nature of the former and subsequent
employment of the employee, whether the actions of the employee
actually violated the terms of the non-compete agreements, and the
nature of the restraint in light of all the circumstances of the case.
The language of the non-compete agreement was considered in the
context of the facts of the specific case. In no case did the Court hold
that the language contained in the restrictive covenant at issue was
valid and enforceable as a matter of law under all circumstances.26
In 2005, the court decided Omniplex World Services Corp. v.
US Investigations Services, Inc.,27 and after a string of unanimous
opinions dealing with restrictive covenants, the seven-member
court split four to three. At issue was the covenant's language:
Employee hereby covenants and agrees that, immediately following
any termination of employment from OMNIPLEX that occurs before
the expiration of the Term, .. . Employee shall not for the remainder
of the Term (i) accept employment, become employed by, or perform
any services for OMNIPLEX's Customer for whom Employee provid-
ed services or for any other employer in a position supporting
OMNIPLEX's Customer, if the employment or engagement requires
Employee to possess the same level of security clearance Employee
relied on during his employment with OMNIPLEXY
In a very concise opinion, the majority determined that the re-
strictions would bar the former employee from working in any ca-
pacity for any business "that provides support of any kind" to a
23. Id. at 494, 561 S.E.2d at 695.
24. Id. (citing Paramount Termite Control Co. v. Rector, 238 Va. 171, 172, 380 S.E.2d
922, 924 (1989)).
25. 282 Va. 412, 420, 718 S.E.2d 762, 766 (2011), overruling Paramount Termite Con-
trol Co., 238 Va. 171, 380 S.E.2d 922 (1989).
26. 263 Va. at 494-95, 561 S.E.2d at 696.
27. 270 Va. 246, 618 S.E.2d 340 (2005).
28. Id. at 248, 618 S.E.2d at 341 (alterations in original).
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particular government customer. 29 Because "the prohibition in
this non-competition provision [was] not limited to employment
that would be in competition with Omniplex," the court deter-
mined it to be "overbroad and unenforceable."30
In a dissent more than twice as long as the majority opinion,
three members of the court expressed the view that the re-
strictions were justified based on the evidence in the case:
The restrictive covenant at issue in this case, when viewed in the
context of the facts of this record, meets the three-part test for the
validity of such covenants particularly for purposes of sufficiency on
a motion to strike the evidence. The contractual restraint has been
amply demonstrated to be reasonable, even essential, to protect Om-
niplex' contractual interests with the SGC. The restraint is no great-
er than necessary to protect that interest, particularly when drawn
for such a short period of time and without restriction on Schaffer's
freedom to seek employment providing services to any employer in
the world except one working at the SGC and requiring her level of
security clearance.
For these same reasons, it cannot be said the restrictive covenant
is unduly harsh in limiting Schaffer's ability to earn a livelihood. Fi-
nally, the restraint is reasonable from a public policy standpoint.
When drawn as narrowly as in this case, the restrictive covenant
safeguards the ability in unique economic circumstances for an em-
ployer to maintain the contracts that enable it to be a viable entity,
particularly in the areas of national security and defense.3'
In 2007, the court returned to unanimity with its decision in
Parikh v. Family Care Center, Inc., in which it reversed trial
court enforcement of a non-compete imposed on a physician."
Although the court recited the elements of the three-prong test
used to evaluate non-compete agreements," it did not reach the
issue of the enforceability of the restrictive language because the
court determined that the parties seeking to enforce the re-
strictions did not have legal standing.34
For the next four years, the court did not issue any published
opinions dealing with post-employment competitive restrictions.
And then the court released its Home Paramount opinion.
29. Id. at 250, 618 S.E.2d at 342-43.
30. Id., 618 S.E.2d at 343.
31. Id. at 258, 618 S.E.2d at 347.
32. 273 Va. 284, 291, 641 S.E.2d 98, 101 (2007).
33. See id. at 288, 641 S.E.2d at 100 (citations omitted).
34. See id. at 291, 641 S.E.2d at 101.
[Vol. 47:457
HOME PARAMOUNT PEST CONTROL V. SHAFFER
IV. HOME PARAMOUNT PEST CONTROL COS. V. SHAFFER:
SEISMIC SHIFT OR ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF A DECADE-LONG TREND?
With its 2007 opinion in Parikh v. Family Care Center, Inc., de-
cided on an issue of standing, the last substantive analysis from
the supreme court on a non-compete case was the 2005 Omniplex
decision that revealed a four-to-three split in the court. By the
time that the 2011 Home Paramount case was under considera-
tion, only two members of the Omniplex court remained members
of the supreme court. Current Chief Justice Cynthia D. Kinser
was a dissenting justice in Omniplex, and Justice Donald W.
Lemons was in the Omniplex majority. 5 With significant turnover
on the court, there was no accurate way to predict what the court
would do in the new Home Paramount decision. On the one hand,
every non-compete opinion in the past decade had been decided in
favor of the employee and against enforcement of restrictions. On
the other hand, the language before the court was identical to the
language the court upheld in 1989 in Paramount Termite Control
Co. v. Rector," which had never been overruled.
The language under review in the 2011 Home Paramount case
was as follows:
The Employee will not engage directly or indirectly or concern him-
self/herself in any manner whatsoever in the carrying on or conduct-
ing the business of exterminating, pest control, termite control
and/or fumigation services as an owner, agent, servant, representa-
tive, or employee, and/or as a member of a partnership andior as an
officer, director or stockholder of any corporation, or in any manner
35. Justice Elizabeth B. Lacy authored the Omniplex majority opinion, 270 Va. at 247,
618 S.E.2d at 341, and subsequently retired. Michael Hardy, Virginia High Court Justice
Says She'll Retire; Selection of Lacy by Baliles in 1988 Was First of Woman, RICH. TIMES-
DISPATCH, June 12, 2007, at B1. She was joined in that opinion by Justice Lemons, Jus-
tice Lawrence L. Koontz, Jr. (retired, Mike Gangloff, Judge Puts Gavel Down After Career
of 43 Years, ROANOKE TIMES, Dec. 5, 2010, at B1), and Senior Justice Roscoe B. Stephen-
son, Jr. (deceased, Jordan Fifer, Alleghany Co. Was Home to Justice, ROANOKE TIMES,
June 1, 2011, at A15). See Omniplex, 270 Va. at 246, 247, 251, 618 S.E.2d at 340-41, 343.
Justice G. Steven Agee (now on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
see Jessica Marcy, Judge from Salem Gets Nod for Federal Post, ROANOKE TIMES, Mar. 14,
2008, at B3) authored the dissenting opinion and was joined by Justice Barbara M. Kee-
nan (also now on the Fourth Circuit, see Alan Cooper, Justice Mims, Former AG, Legisla-
tor, Joins Va. Supreme Court, VA. LAW. WKLY., Apr. 19, 2010, at 2. 18) and Justice Kinser
(now Chief Justice, see Michael Sluss, Female Justice Picked to Lead, ROANOKE TIMES,
Sept. 1, 2010, at All). See Omniplex, 270 Va. at 251, 618 S.E.2d at 343.
36. Compare Home Paramount Pest Control Cos. v. Shaffer, 282 Va. 412, 414-15, 718
S.E.2d 762, 763 (2011), with Paramount Termite Control Co. v. Rector, 238 Va. 171, 172-
73, 380 S.E.2d 922, 924 (1989).
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whatsoever, in any city, cities, county or counties in the state(s) in
which the Employee works and/or in which the Employee was as-
signed during the two (2) years next preceding the termination of the
Employment Agreement and for a period of two (2) years from and
after the date upon which he/she shall cease for any reason whatso-
ever to be an employee of [Home Paramount].
Applying a de novo standard of review and reciting the estab-
lished three-prong test,3 8 the court determined that the re-
strictions were "akin to those we found unenforceable in Simmons
and Motion Control."'" Continuing, the court stated:
On its face, [the contract] prohibits Shaffer from working for Con-
nor's or any other business in the pest control industry in any capac-
ity. It bars him from engaging even indirectly, or concerning himself
in any manner whatsoever, in the pest control business, even as a
passive stockholder of a publicly traded international conglomerate
with a pest control subsidiary. The circuit court therefore did not err
in requiring Home Paramount to prove it had a legitimate business
interest in such a sweeping prohibition.
40
In reaching the decision to affirm the circuit court's judgment
that the restrictions were overbroad and unenforceable, the court
acknowledged that in 1989 it approved of the same language
dealing with the same company.' Confronted directly with the
doctrine of stare decisis, the court opined that it is "not an inexo-
rable command"42 and found a duty "'to acknowledge when...
later decisions have presented an irreconcilable conflict with [the
earlier] precedent."'43 Accordingly, the court found it appropriate
to overrule its prior Paramount decision.
4
Although Chief Justice Kinser joined the dissent in Omniplex
45and argued for restrictive covenant enforcement in that case,
she joined the majority in the 2011 Home Paramount opinion.
The decision drew only one dissent, and it came from one of the
two newest members of the court, Justice Elizabeth McClana-
37. 282 Va. at 414-15, 718 S.E.2d at 763 (alteration in original).
38. Id. at 415, 718 S.E.2d at 763-64.
39. Id. at 418, 718 S.E.2d at 765.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 420, 718 S.E.2d at 766.
42. Id. at 419, 718 S.E.2d at 766 (internal citation omitted).
43. Id. at 419-20, 718 S.E.2d at 766 (quoting Newman v. Erie Ins. Exch., 256 Va. 501,
509, 507 S.E.2d 348, 352-53 (1998)) (alteration in original).
44. Id. at 420, 718 S.E.2d at 766.
45. See Omniplex World Servs. v. US Investigations Servs., Inc., 270 Va. 246, 251, 618
S.E.2d 340, 343 (2005) (Agee, J., dissenting).
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han.46 Noting, quite correctly, that the "test for determining the
validity of a non-compete agreement was the same" when the
court decided the 1989 Paramount case, and observing that the
dispute involved the same language and the same company seek-
ing enforcement, Justice McClanahan opined that stare decisis
should require a ruling that the language is enforceable.47
There are several important lessons to be learned from the
2011 Home Paramount decision and the prior decade of decisions
striking down non-compete agreements.
First, unless an employer truly has legitimate business inter-
ests that justify post-employment protection, no employer should
seek to impose such restrictions. If put to the test, an employer
will have to prove the business necessity for each restriction and
all of the language utilized in an agreement.
Second, if a covenant not to compete is going to be implement-
ed, the language must be crafted with great care. There is a tre-
mendous temptation in agreements to use sweeping terminology,
such as "including, but not limited to" and "directly or indirectly."
Imprecise "catch-all" language makes it easy for an employee to
demonstrate the absurd lengths to which such restrictions might
extend. For example, when the functional limitations "include"
but "are not limited to" a list of activities, how can the court or
parties know what else is contemplated by the limitations? Simi-
larly, when an activity is prohibited both "directly" and "indirect-
ly," what does "indirectly" actually prohibit?
Third, parties seeking the protection of restrictive covenants
should limit the functional limitations to vital and clearly prova-
ble business interests. Employers are not entitled to complete in-
sulation from competition by former employees, but they can of-
ten justify protecting core business interests. Employers ought to
be able to determine what constitutes their vital business con-
cerns, and they must resist the temptation to protect anything
more than that.
46. Justice McClanahan and Justice Cleo E. Powell were elected by the Virginia Gen-
eral Assembly on July 29, 2011, in the 2011 Special Session I with their terms commenc-
ing August 1, 2011. Mike DeBonis, Assembly Fills Spots on Va.'s High Court, WASH. POST,
July 30, 2011, at BO.
47. Home Paramount Pest Control Cos., 282 Va. at 420-21, 718 S.E.2d at 766-67
(McClanahan, J., dissenting).
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Fourth, employers and attorneys have to recognize that there is
no such thing in Virginia as a "standard" restrictive covenant.
The functional limitations depend on what type of work the em-
ployer does and what the employee did while working for the em-
ployer. Geographic limitations should coincide with core market
areas. The length of duration should be justifiable based on actu-
al company data or other competent analyses. It is never suffi-
cient for an employer to argue that the restrictions are "typical"
or "normal." The burden is on the employer to prove the need for
and narrow tailoring of each restriction.
V. UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN VIRGINIA NON-COMPETE LAW
While the opinions from the Supreme Court of Virginia in the
past decade have made it clear that the court has adopted a skep-
tical view of non-compete agreements, there are a number of un-
answered questions.
A. What Does the 'Public Policy" Part of the Three-Prong Test
Actually Mean?
The third prong of the traditional test asks this question: "Is
the restraint reasonable from the standpoint of a sound public
policy?"48 However, there are no cases from the supreme court an-
swering the question of what this means. In Simmons v. Miller,
the court found that an "unnecessary and unreasonable restraint
of trade" was "offensive to the public policy of the Commonwealth
and is not enforceable,"4 but that statement does little to provide
any depth or definitional meaning to this part of the test. In this
author's opinion, the most likely application of the public policy
prong to invalidate a covenant will come in the medical or oth-
er "necessary" professional context. For example, if a post-
employment non-competition agreement would have the impact of
removing a much-needed doctor from a certain geographic area
that will then suffer a hardship, that is the type of circumstance
48. Richardson v. Paxton Co., 203 Va. 790, 794, 127 S.E.2d 113, 417 (1962) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
49. 261 Va. 561, 582, 544 S.E.2d 666, 678-79 (2001).
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that would justify a finding that public policy outweighs the pri-
vate considerations underlying the competitive restrictions.
B. Is Ambiguity in Restrictions Fatal to Enforcement?
In an often-cited statement from a 1983 United States district
court opinion, Judge Robert Merhige invalidated a restrictive
covenant and held that the difficulty of determining the "exact
reach of the covenant... renders the covenant overbroad."5'
Twelve years later, Chief Judge Jackson Kiser, of the Western
District of Virginia, cited Judge Merhige's opinion in stating that
the "mere act of subjecting the employee to the uncertainty of an
ambiguous provision offends public policy.' 2 Although numerous
circuit court opinions have cited these statements from Judge
Merhige and Chief Judge Kiser,"s the supreme court has neither
cited their opinions nor expressly stated agreement with the idea
that ambiguity in the restrictions will necessarily cause them to
fail. As a practical matter, however, ambiguities probably do
nothing more than demonstrate overbreadth, and the supreme
court has made it clear that overbreadth is fatal to enforcement.54
C. Are Non-Solicitation Clauses Subject to the Same Test
Applicable to Non-Competition Provisions?
The supreme court has never expressly held that non-
solicitation provisions are to be analyzed pursuant to the same
three-prong test applicable to non-compete agreements. However,
50. In Etheridge u. Medical Center Hospitals, the court upheld the cap on medical
malpractice damages based, primarily, on deference to the General Assembly's judgment
that there is a strong public policy interest in making sure that medical services remain
widely available to the general public. 237 Va. 87, 93-94, 107, 376 S.E.2d 525, 527-28, 536
(1989). That determination provides significant ammunition for an argument that efforts
to prevent doctors from working in certain areas should be invalidated or, at most, tolerat-
ed only when it is clear that there are an abundance of providers of the particular type of
medical care at issue.
51. Power Distrib., Inc. v. Emergency Power Eng'g, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 54, 58 (E.D. Va.
1983).
52. Roto-Die Co. v. Lesser, 899 F. Supp. 1515, 1521 (W.D. Va. 1995) (citing Power Dis-
trib. Inc., 569 F. Supp. at 58 (footnote omitted)).
53. See, e.g., Innovative Sys. & Solutions, Inc. v. Hannah, 75 Va. Cir. 363, 370-71
(2008) (Norfolk City).
54. Home Paramount Pest Control Cos. v. Shaffer, 282 Va. 412, 419, 718 S.E.2d 762,
765 (2011).
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in Therapy Services, Inc. v. Crystal City Nursing Center, inc.,55 the
court determined that an employee non-solicitation agreement
between businesses is "a contract in restraint of trade and will be
held void as against public policy if it is unreasonable as between
the parties or is injurious to the public."56 This supreme court
opinion (along with other authority) recently was cited by a cir-
cuit court as support for the premise that non-solicitation "cove-
nants are generally analyzed in the same manner as covenants
not to compete. ' 7
D. Is Blue-Penciling Allowable and Enforceable? Can Inclusion of
a Blue Pencil Clause Be Fatal?
Many non-competition agreements contain language designed
to save the agreement from total loss in the event that any por-
tion of the language is deemed to be invalid and unenforceable.
Often, this takes the form of a severability provision where the
parties agree to sever out any provisions found to be defective,
while letting the remainder of the agreement stand. Other
agreements attempt to authorize the court to rewrite the re-
strictions through blue-pencil power in the event that any defects
are determined." Some agreements, rather confusingly, attempt
to use both kinds of provisions. There is no indication, however,
that the supreme court is inclined to rule that judges in Virginia
have blue-pencil power, even if the parties agree.
The only mention of blue-penciling (or any version of this ter-
minology) in supreme court case law is found in National Title In-
surance Corp. Agency v. First Union Bank.5 9 In that case, the
court noted that one of the litigants claimed that the circuit
55. 239 Va. 385, 389 S.E.2d 710 (1990).
56. Id. at 388, 389 S.E.2d at 711.
57. Patient First Richmond Med. Grp., LLC v. Blanco, No. CL10-6211, 2011 Va. Cir.
LEXIS 107, at *9 (Cir. Ct. Feb. 15, 2011) (Virginia Beach City) (citing Strategic Res., Inc.
v. Nevin, No. 1:05cv992, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30985, at *10-11 (E.D. Va. Nov. 23, 2005);
Strategic Enter. Solutions, Inc. v. Ikuma, 77 Va. Cir. 179 (2008) (Fairfax County); Int'l Pa-
per Co. v. Brooks, 63 Va. Cir. 494, 495-96 (2003) (Roanoke City); Therapy Servs., Inc., 239
Va. at 385, 389 S.E.2d at 710), cert. denied, (Aug. 1, 2011), pet. for reh'rg denied, (Sept. 23,
2011).
58. See Roto-Die Co., 899 F. Supp. at 1522-23 (discussing in detail severing, blue-
penciling, and their differences).
59. 263 Va. 355, 364 n.5, 559 S.E.2d 668, 673 n.5 (2002).
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court improperly engaged in blue-penciling, but without address-
ing whether such is ever allowable, the court simply determined
that the circuit court did not do it.s°
Although the supreme court has not expressly rejected the con-
cept of blue-penciling, other courts in Virginia have, and the
overwhelming weight of authority is against the concept. In fact,
at least one circuit court has determined that merely including a
blue-pencil provision will "render the agreement unenforceable." 2
E. Does Virginia Code Section 59.1-9.5 Render All Restrictive
Covenants Invalid?
Virginia Code section 59.1-9.5, which is a part of the Virginia
Antitrust Act,63 provides that "every contract.., in restraint of
trade or commerce of this Commonwealth is unlawful."' The
courts have consistently held that post-employment restrictive
agreements are "restraint[s] of trade,6 5 and statutory construc-
tion requires giving the "words used" their plain meaning, "unless
a literal construction would involve a manifest absurdity."6 While
the supreme court has not analyzed Virginia Code section 59.1-
9.5 in the context of non-competition agreements, a recent case
from a circuit court in Virginia has. Despite the mandate to con-
strue and interpret statutes in accordance with the plain lan-
guage used by the General Assembly, the circuit court deter-
mined that antitrust provisions are "rule[s] of reason" and ruled
that the statute does not constitute an absolute bar to restrictive
covenant enforcement.
6 7
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Lanmark Tech., Inc. v. Canales, 454 F. Supp. 2d 524, 529 (E.D. Va. 2006)
(citations omitted) (rejecting blue-penciling and discussing authority); Pitchford v.
Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 958, 965-66 (W.D. Va. 2000) (citations
omitted) (similarly rejecting blue-penciling and discussing authority).
62. Pace v. Ret. Plan Admin. Serv., 74 Va. Cir. 201, 205 (2007) (Richmond City) (cita-
tions omitted).
63. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-9.1 to -9.18 (Repl. Vol. 2006).
64. Id. § 59.1-9.5 (Repl. Vol. 2006).
65. See, e.g., Modern Env'ts, Inc. v. Stinnett, 263 Va. 491, 493, 561 S.E.2d 694, 695
(2002).
66. Davis v. Tazewell Place Assocs., 254 Va. 257, 260-61, 492 S.E.2d 162, 164 (1997)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
67. Integrity Auto Specialists, Inc. v. Meyer, No. CL-10114 (Va. Cir. Ct. June 28,
2011) (Chesapeake City) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the fanfare with which some employment lawyers
greeted the supreme court's 2011 Home Paramount decision, it
did not mark a sea change or seismic shift in restrictive covenant
jurisprudence. As the court stated, it has "gradually refined" its
analysis and "incrementally clarified the law since [the prior Par-
amount] case was decided in 1989.""6 Although it is certainly true
that the court has cleaned up some of the obvious conflict present
in its prior decisions, many questions remain unresolved, and
without a doubt, they will provide fertile ground for future litiga-
tion and appeals.
68. Home Paramount Pest Control Cos. v. Shaffer, 282 Va. 412, 420, 718 S.E.2d 762,
766 (2011).
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